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INTRODUCTION
With the global epidemiological transition 
from communicable to non-communicable 
diseases, hypertension has become a 
major risk factor for burden of  disease 
in many high, middle, and low income 
countries.[1] While no absolute cut point 
exists for high blood pressure, persistent 
systolic blood pressure readings of  > 
140 and/or diastolic blood pressure 
readings of  > 90 are commonly defined 
as hypertension.[2] Hypertension is a risk 
factor for cardiovascular disease and its 
management is advocated to reduce burden 
to both individuals and health systems.
With the rise in long-term conditions, 
health care systems around the world are 
under pressure to curb health care costs 
while maintaining quality. In response, 
many countries have introduced pay 
for performance (P4P) programs that 
incentivize institutions and professionals 
to provide high quality care and to mitigate 
the potential weaknesses of  other payment 
mechanisms such as fee for service. [3] 
P4P programs have been widely adopted 
internationally in low, middle, and high 
income countries such as UK, US, Thailand, 
Germany, and Australia.
WHAT IS P4P?
Pay for performance is an over-arching term 
for a method of  rewarding organizations 
and/or individuals based upon their 
performance against identified criteria, 
which, depending upon the scheme, may 
include measures of  quality, reporting, 
efficiency, and/or value. [4] Therefore, 
the aims, content, and structure of  P4P 
schemes are highly diverse. However, 
there is commonality in that schemes 
are focused upon modifying healthcare 
provider behaviors and that payments are 
linked to achievement of  identified criteria, 
frequently quality indicators.[5]
The theory underpinning this approach 
is that financial rewards are important in 
motivating healthcare providers, specifically 
financial incentives that focus on quality 
of  care. This is important so that quality 
is not neglected in comparison with other 
measures such as volume of  care provided.[6] 
The size of  the incentive is assumed to be 
key to how individuals respond. However, 
there is evidence to suggest that this 
response is more complex and also, affected 
by the design and implementation of  the 
P4P scheme. [7]
DESIGNING A P4P SCHEME
When designing a P4P scheme, there is an 
understandable tendency to focus upon 
the activities to be incentivized. While this 
is obviously important, it should not be to 
the detriment of  consideration of  design 
and implementation issues. These include 
definitions of  quality and the scope of  the 
scheme; identification of  quality measures; 
measuring and rewarding performance; and 
data availability, reporting and verification.
Defining quality and the scope of the 
scheme
Quality is a multi-dimensional concept 
and its definition has changed over time 
(see Table 1).It includes concepts such as 
safety, effectiveness, being patient-centered, 
timeliness, efficiency, equity, value for money, 
access, and patient experience. And for 
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many health systems, the focus is shifting to patient safety 
and experience. Having a working definition of  quality is 
important when developing a P4P scheme as it guides the 
selection and development of  quality indicators.[13]
Quality measures can then be categorized according 
to structure, process, and outcomes of  care. Structural 
measures address the environment in which care is 
delivered and may reference, for example, the physical 
space, staffing, or available equipment. Process measures 
focus upon care activities undertaken by the healthcare 
provider such as recording of  blood pressure or taking of  
blood tests. Outcome measures focus upon the ultimate 
impact of  the care delivered in terms of  the health 
outcomes experienced by patients. Outcome measures 
are challenging to incorporate into a P4P framework due 
to the question of  attribution to an individual physician 
or organization.
Development and identification of quality 
measures
It is important to note that no international consensus 
exists as to the best approach to quality indicator 
development.[13, 14] Stelfox and Strauss[13] identify two broad 
approaches to development: inductive or deductive. These 
are comparable to the classification offered by Campbell 
et al.[15] of  non-systematic and systematic approaches. 
Inductive or non-systematic approaches start with 
the available data or a clinical incident and then move 
towards defining the concept to be measured. Deductive 
or systematic approaches take the opposite approach 
in that the clinically important concepts are identified 
initially and used as the basis for indicator development. 
Deductive approaches aim to ensure a strong link between 
the scientific evidence and the resulting indicator, often 
having their roots in clinical guidelines. However, they 
have also been criticized for failing to consider issues 
of  the importance of  the care concept and being poorly 
specified from a patient’s perspective.[13] Rigid adherence to 
guideline recommendations also fails to acknowledge the 
many uncertainties and limits of  scientific knowledge in 
relation to health care,[16] which may be more pronounced 
in different care settings, for example, family medicine. 
Incorporating expert opinion through the use of  consensus 
techniques such as the RAND appropriateness method 
can be useful here.[15]
Irrespective of  the method used, there are a number of  
steps that need to be taken to move from a guideline 
recommendation to a quality measure. The first of  these 
is to develop a quality indicator that specifies the clinical 
situation and the care that should or should not be given. 
It may be useful to write these in an IF-THEN format.[14] 
Further detailed specification is then required to convert 
these statements to quality measures. We would agree with 
Shekelle[14] that this requires input from a multi-disciplinary 
team composed of  measurement experts alongside clinical 
experts. In our experience, this is also an iterative process 
as the implications of  different approaches to measure 
wording and component specification are considered in 
conjunction with the available data sources. For example, 
when considering a family medicine indicator related to the 
monitoring of  blood pressure in people with hypertension, 
it is first necessary to consider whether this will be 
measured from the patient’s or clinician’s perspective, then 
to define what constitutes a diagnosis of  hypertension, what 
constitutes blood pressure monitoring, and the maximum 
reasonable time periods between monitoring.
Quality measures should also be subject to a period of  field 
testing. This allows for an assessment of  reliability, validity, 
feasibility, and acceptability of  the measure to those being 
measured. [17] As part of  this process, the measures should be 
assessed to consider the extent to which their incentivization 
would constitute an efficient use of  public funds and 
provide value for money. Cost–effectiveness analysis is 
one such approach, involving the calculation of  costs per 
quality adjusted life year (QALY). Services with a lower 
cost per QALY can be considered cost-effective and those 
with a higher cost per QALY may not be considered cost-
effective. This approach is attractive as it allows all measures 
to be assessed using the same metric, an incremental cost–
effectiveness ration, thus allowing the cost–effectiveness of  
different measures to be compared. [18]
Table 1: Dimensions of quality of care
Donabedian 1990[9] Maxwell 1992[8] Campbell 2000[10] Institute of Medicine 
2001[11]
NHS Next Stage Review 
2008[12]
Access Access
Acceptability Acceptability
Effectiveness Effectiveness Effectiveness Effectiveness Effectiveness
Efficiency Efficiency Efficiency Efficiency
Equity Equity Equity Equity
Efficacy Relevance Patient-centeredness Patient experience
Legitimacy Safety Safety
Optimality Timeliness 
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Measure development represents a significant undertaking 
and therefore consideration should always be given to 
whether there are existing measures that may be adapted. 
Both the National Quality Measures Clearinghouse 
(http://www.qualitymeasures.ahrq.gov/) in the US and the 
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (http://
www.nice.org.uk/standards-and-indicators/qofindicators) 
in the UK maintain a menu of  quality measures that have 
been subject to initial assessment of  reliability, validity, and 
acceptability. While quality measures identified in this way 
require an assessment to ensure that they are appropriate 
for adoption, previous work suggests that there are areas 
of  commonality, even between quite differently funded 
health systems.[19] As well as offering efficiencies in the 
development process, utilizing existing indicators supports 
international comparisons of  care.
Measuring and rewarding performance
P4P schemes also need to detail the way in which 
performance will be measured and rewarded. This 
encompasses questions such as whether to reward absolute 
achievement against a measure, that is, achieving a pre-
determined payment threshold or improvement above 
baseline measurement or a combination of  both, the size 
of  the incentive, when the reward should be given and to 
whom.
Data availability, reporting, and verification
Measure development and adoption will be influenced by 
the availability of  data and how it is reported. Electronic 
medical records offer the potential for query specifications 
to be developed centrally and anonymized data to be 
extracted and reported with minimal impact upon the 
organization. Manual reporting methods such as local 
audit, will require different levels of  support and indicator 
specifications. Greater consideration will need to be given 
to sample size and selection criteria and ensuring inter-
rater reliability. If  this audit is to be completed by external 
personnel then this will add to the cost of  the scheme.
USE OF P4P IN HYPERTENSION 
MANAGEMENT IN THE UK
In many respects, hypertension management lends 
itself  to inclusion in P4P schemes. There are national 
and international guidelines for its identification and 
management, recommended care processes can be 
translated into measurable statements and it is possible to 
articulate and measure the desired outcomes of  treatment.[20] 
The care of  these patients accounts for 17% of  the 
available reward for general practices in the Quality and 
Outcomes Framework (QOF) for England. [21] At present, 
five indicators are included (see Table 2), which focus 
upon hypertension as a discrete condition, six on the 
management of  blood pressure in patients with other 
conditions such as diabetes, two upon modifiable risk 
factors associated with hypertension such as smoking and 
one upon population-based monitoring of  blood pressure. 
Further measures have also been tested and are available 
for use via the indicator development process managed 
by NICE, although these have not been incorporated into 
the incentive structure. A similar range of  measures are 
Table 2: QOF indicators, payment thresholds, points and incentive value (per practice) 2015/16
Indicator Payment 
threshold
Points value Incentive value 
(per practice)
HYP001. The contractor establishes and maintains a register of patients with 
established hypertension
n/a 6 £961
HYP006. The percentage of patients with hypertension in whom the last blood 
pressure reading (measured in the preceding 12 months) is 150/90 mmHg or less
45–80% 20 £3203
CVD-PP001. In those patients with a new diagnosis of hypertension aged 30 or 
over and who have not attained the age of 75, recorded between the preceding 1 
April to 31 March (excluding those with pre-existing CHD, diabetes, stroke and/
or TIA), who have a recorded CVD risk assessment score (using an assessment 
tool agreed with the NHS Commissioning Board) of ≥ 20% in the preceding 12 
months: the percentage who are currently treated with statins
40–90% 10 £1602
SMOK002. The percentage of patients with any or any combination of the 
following conditions: CHD, PAD, stroke or TIA, hypertension, diabetes, COPD, 
CKD, asthma, schizophrenia, bipolar affective disorder or other psychoses whose 
notes record smoking status in the preceding 12 months
50–90% 25 £4004
SMOK005. The percentage of patients with any or any combination of the 
following conditions: CHD, PAD, stroke or TIA, hypertension, diabetes, COPD, 
CKD, asthma, schizophrenia, bipolar affective disorder or other psychoses who 
are recorded as current smokers who have a record of an offer of support and 
treatment within the preceding 12 months
56–96% 25 £4004
CHD: coronary heart disease, TIA: transient ischemic attack, CVD: cardiovascular disease, PAD: peripheral arterial disease, COPD: chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease, CKD: chronic kidney disease.
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available via the National Quality Measures Clearinghouse 
in the US.
IMPACT OF P4P UPON 
HYPERTENSION MANAGEMENT
So how has P4P impacted upon the management of  
hypertension? Available evidence is mixed and moderated 
by the design of  the P4P scheme, which makes drawing 
definitive conclusions challenging. Between 2004 and 
2014, average national achievement of  the proportion 
of  patients with hypertension in England whose latest 
recorded blood pressure (measured in the preceding 9 
months) was 150/90 mmHg or less (an audit rather than 
an individual care standard) increased from 71.5 to 79.2%. 
A further slight increase to 80.4% was observed in 2015, 
when the time interval for measurement was increased to 
12 months.[22] Within England, therefore, the incentive has 
done little to improve the proportion of  patients achieving 
blood pressure control at a national level, despite this being 
one of  the most heavily incentivized indicators within the 
framework.
This lack of  impact has also been reported by Serumaga et 
al.[23] in their interrupted time series analysis of  hypertension 
management before and after the introduction of  P4P. 
Similarly, there were no significant changes to the numbers 
of  patients being treated with combination therapy. This 
trend was observed prior to implementation of  P4P and 
was subsequently sustained.
On a more positive note, they did not find evidence of  
gaming to achieve targets. Nationally reported data on 
the numbers of  patients excluded from the indicator 
denominator through a process known as exception 
reporting has remained constant at approximately 3–4%, 
which would support this conclusion. However, potential 
gaming activity has been described by others, in particular 
the rounding down of  recorded blood pressure by a 
few mmHg in order to meet the target.[20] This may be 
perceived as being unlikely to have any significant clinical 
consequences for the patient, but may have significant 
financial impact on the physician or family practice.
Another contributing factor to this apparent lack of  
impact could be the threshold set for the payment of  
the incentive. Within the UK, the QOF rewards absolute 
achievement with an upper and lower threshold for 
minimum and maximum payment. In 2004/05, these 
were set at 25–70% and are currently set at 45–80%. This 
could well be below the level required for physicians to 
change their practice. Pilot testing of  indicators, which 
did not commence until 2008, could have given an 
indication of  current levels of  achievement and been 
used to inform threshold setting. Whether or not the 
incentives for hypertension demonstrate value for money 
would require an assessment of  the benefits gained 
by the modest increase in the proportion of  patients 
with hypertension with well controlled blood pressure 
compared with the costs of  providing the required 
interventions, plus the incentive points awarded for 
threshold achievement.
Alternatively, it could be that the incentive was applied 
to the wrong organization. Petersen et al.[24] undertook a 
cluster randomized controlled trial to evaluate the impact 
of  P4P upon adherence to guideline-based hypertension 
care comparing incentives paid to individual physicians, to 
practices, mixed individual and practice payments and no 
payment. They observed no significant differences in blood 
pressure control between the intervention and control 
groups unless the incentive was aimed at the individual 
physician. In common with other studies, this effect was 
not sustained once the incentive was withdrawn.[25]
While improvement against blood pressure control targets 
may be disappointing, it has also been suggested that 
this is not the most clinically meaningful measure, and 
that clinician response to a sub-optimal blood pressure 
recording is a better discriminator of  quality. These clinical 
action measures place an equal emphasis upon achieving 
a control target or on taking appropriate clinical action 
such as modification of  therapy in a timely manner. By 
taking this approach, Weiler et al.[26] were able to identify 
52% of  patients with hypertension as receiving quality 
care as opposed to 20% when taking a target-based 
approach. Measures such as these, however, require a more 
sophisticated approach to data collection and analysis than 
control target measures alone.
Control target measures, in the absence of  case-mix 
adjustment, may also promote over-treatment.[27] This risk 
is becoming more acute given an aging population and an 
increase in the numbers of  people with multi-morbidity 
who may require complex trade-offs in optimal single 
disease management to achieve individualized person-
centered care. However, such case-mix adjustments 
are difficult to define. One option therefore is to allow 
clinicians to opt patients out of  the care described in quality 
measures in a pre-determined set of  circumstances. Within 
the UK QOF, this process is termed exception reporting. 
Recent analysis has suggested that the likelihood of  being 
exception reported is strongly related to increasing age 
and numbers of  co-morbid conditions.[28] While this might 
suggest that it is being used to protect patients from the 
detrimental effects of  over-treatment, further qualitative 
work is required to fully understand the process of  deciding 
to exception report a patient.
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CONCLUSION
P4P schemes are extremely diverse in their design and 
implementation with the potential for system-wide impact. 
Because of  this, evaluation in one country may have limited 
transferability to other health systems and design structures. 
Many aspects of  the management of  hypertension 
appear amenable to quantitative measurement, although 
depending upon current levels of  care, may or may not 
require incentivization. Evaluation of  impact therefore is 
highly sensitive to the local context. In order to maximize 
the potential for shared learning, it is important that this is 
recognized and that attention is given not only to performing 
the evaluation itself, ideally within a trial setting, but also to 
describing the constituent parts of  this complex intervention.
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